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Since the mid-1970s, the macroeconomic consequences of wage
indexation has been the subject of considerable research. Starting
with an enthusiastic proposal for indexation by Friedman (1974)
and two influential papers by Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977), the
academic literature has examined the effects of wage indexation
on the costs of disinflation and the level of inflation, the effects of
wage indexation on the behavior of an economy hit by alternative
types of shocks, the relation between wage indexation and exchange
rate and monetary policy, the type of indexation indicators that
are best suited for macroeconomic stability, and so on. The sizable
literature that has emerged on the subject is reviewed by Car-
michael, Fahrer, and Hawkins (1986), Aizenman (1987), Devereux
(1994), Van Gompel (1994), Riveros (1996), and Landerretche, Le-
fort, and Valdés (in this volume).
Following Gray’s (1976) analysis, most of the academic litera-
ture on this subject studies the effects of wage indexation under the
key assumption that indexing is with respect to current inflation.
This assumption implies that wage indexation helps to stabilize the
real wage, which in standard models has strong implications on the
behavior of the economy. For instance, it directly implies the well-
known proposition that wage indexation would help to maintain full
employment when shocks are nominal and would exacerbate em-
ployment and output fluctuations when shocks are real. As empha-
sized by Fischer (1977, 1985, 1988) and Simonsen (1983), however,
Esteban Jadresic
Central Bank of Chile
THE MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WAGE INDEXATION REVISITED
207
Indexation, Inflation, and Monetary Policy, edited by Fernando Lefort and Klaus
Schmidt-Hebbel, Santiago, Chile.    2002 Central Bank of Chile. C208 Esteban Jadresic
standard wage indexation is not based on current inflation. Indexed
wage contracts typically adjust wages to the evolution of prices infre-
quently and with a lag, such that cost-of-living adjustments are de-
termined according to lagged inflation rather than current inflation.
The fact that typical cost-of-living adjustments are based on
lagged inflation is central because it implies that standard wage
indexation defines a nominal rather than a real type of rigidity. As
shown below, the basic implication of wage indexation to lagged
inflation is a distinct and nontrivial dynamic behavior of nominal
wages, stemming from both the direct effect of the indexation claus-
es and the indirect effect of those clauses on the outcome of wage
negotiations. Because these mechanisms for wage adjustments can
only respond to inflation with a lag, wage indexation need not sta-
bilize or even affect the real wage, as the real wage can vary with
changes in current inflation.1 Similarly, the aggregate consequences
of wage indexation generally depend on the nature of monetary
policy, among other factors. An obvious corollary is that there is
no a priori reason why the effects of actual wage indexation should
necessarily resemble those implied by the assumption that wages
are indexed to current inflation.
Until recently, the formal academic literature has not explicitly
explored the consequences of contracts that index wages to lagged
inflation. As mentioned above, most of this literature assumes that
wage indexation is based on current inflation. Moreover, while Fis-
cher (1977, 1985, 1988) examines in detail the effects of wage con-
tracts with certain lagged indexation rules, the formulas he considers
do not correspond to the typical indexation rule by which current
wages are adjusted according to past inflation. Similarly, while Si-
monsen (1983) is persuasive in arguing that disinflation under lagged
wage indexation is costly—unlike disinflation under perfect wage
indexation—his formal model is not based on an explicit consider-
ation of wage contracts indexed to lagged inflation. In consequence,
his model cannot be used to compare the effects of indexed wage
contracts with those of nonindexed wage contracts, which is the
most relevant comparison in practice.
I attempt to fill part of the gap in the literature on wage index-
ation in three recent papers (Jadresic, 1996, 1998, 2002). These pa-
pers have in common the explicit modeling of wage indexation as a
1. For instance, in an economy in which labor productivity is constant and firms’
individual demand curves are isoelastic, optimal price setting can imply a constant
price-wage ratio regardless of whether wages are indexed or nonindexed.209 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
clause in long-term contracts that grants periodical cost-of-living ad-
justments according to the inflation rate cumulated since the last
wage revision. In addition, they evaluate the consequences of wage
indexation by comparing the behavior of the economy in the presence
of contracts with indexation clauses against two main alternative stan-
dards of reference. The first is defined by the behavior of the econo-
my under long-term contracts that specify preset time-varying wages
during the life of each contract. The second yardstick is defined by
the behavior of the economy under short-term contracts that specify
fixed wages during the life of each contract.
This paper reviews the main lessons emerging from the above
papers and explores a further implication of indexing wage contracts
to lagged inflation, namely, the consequences of wage indexation dur-
ing exchange-rate-based stabilization. While the paper provides some
background to the issues being examined, it is not the intent here to
provide a general review of the literature on wage indexation, which
has been surveyed elsewhere. Rather, the focus of the paper is on
the macroeconomic consequences of indexing wages to lagged infla-
tion. The paper reviews the consequences of wage indexation to lagged
inflation on the aggregate wage, the cost of disinflation under mon-
ey- and exchange-rate-based stabilization, the variability of output
under alternative types of shocks and policy regimes, the choice of
exchange-rate regime, and the level and variability of inflation.
Two main lessons emerge from this review. First, the standard
analysis of wage indexation in the academic literature provides a
very misleading picture of the consequences of the typical type of
wage indexation observed in real life. In particular, the assumption
that wages are indexed to current inflation is of little usefulness
even as a gross approximation of the issue. Second, taking into ac-
count the lags in actual wage indexation validates the views that
most policymakers and applied observers seem to have on the con-
sequences of wage indexation, although with some qualifications.
The paper is organized as follows. Following this introduction,
section 1 briefly reviews previous approaches to model wage in-
dexation. Section 2 presents the model of wage contracts indexed
to lagged inflation in the papers mentioned above and two models
of nonindexed wage contracts that can be used as benchmarks for
comparison purposes. Sections 3 through 5 examine the implica-
tions of using these models on the macroeconomic issues listed
above. Section 6 summarizes these implications and extracts the
main lessons that emerge from the analysis.210 Esteban Jadresic
1. MODELS OF WAGE INDEXATION IN THE
PREVIOUS LITERATURE
To avoid confusion, it is useful to pinpoint the meaning of wage
indexation. The definition adopted here is provided by Aizenman
(1987) in his survey article for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Eco-
nomics: “Wage indexation is a mechanism designed to adjust wages
to information that cannot be foreseen when the wage contract is
negotiated. A wage contract with indexation clauses will specify the
wage base (i.e., the money wage applicable in the absence of new
information), the indexation formula that will be used to update
wages, and how often updating will occur. Most traditional discus-
sion has focused on wage indexation to the price level....”
According to this definition, the mere adjustment of wages to
reflect inflation does not qualify as wage indexation. What is spe-
cial about indexation is that it is a mechanism that enables wages
to adjust to new information without the need to renegotiate the
contract. If the adjustment of wages in line with inflation is due to
the outcome of wage renegotiations or to a preset path of wage
adjustments agreed at the time the contracts were signed, such
adjustment in general cannot be attributed to wage indexation. To
discern the effects of wage indexation, one should compare the
effects of wage contracts that include indexation clauses against
the effects of wage contracts without those clauses.
1.1 Wage Indexation to Current Inflation
Following Gray’s (1976) original analysis, the standard model
in the academic literature assumes that wage indexation adjusts
wages according to the changes in the current price level. The
model considers only one period, say period t. Right before the
beginning of this period, wage contracts are negotiated. During
the period, macroeconomic shocks are realized. Given a degree of
indexation , the change in wages (wt) is assumed to be
where t is the inflation rate in period t. (Unless otherwise indicated,
variables are hereafter measured in log terms, with lowercase letters
representing their first differences and capital letters their levels.)
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Given this specification, the effects of wage indexation are stud-
ied by varying the degree of indexation. Under full wage index-
ation is taken to be unit and the real wage is thus assumed to be
fixed. The absence of indexation corresponds to  = 0, which
assumes that without indexation the contract’s nominal wage is
fixed. Intermediate degrees of indexation correspond to partial
wage indexation.
The direct implication of this approach is that wage indexation
helps to stabilize the real wage. This effect might be irrelevant if
the contracts negotiated between firms and workers are fully effi-
cient. In standard macroeconomic models, however, in which these
contracts establish wage conditions while employment is deter-
mined by labor demand, this increased real wage rigidity due to
wage indexation has strong implications for the behavior of the
economy. The best known is that wage indexation would stabilize
output when shocks are nominal but destabilize output when shocks
are real. Other implications are mentioned below.
1.2 Lagged Wage Indexation
The above approach is simple and has strong implications, but
it has long been recognized that standard wage indexation is based
on lagged rather than current inflation. Because of the lags in the
availability of information about aggregate price indexes, actual
cost-of-living adjustments due to indexation tend to be based on
past inflation. Possibly more important, wage revisions due to in-
dexation in practice are not done in every possible period. With
infrequent indexation, even if current consumer price indexes
(CPIs) were available in every period, wage adjustments are not
proportional to current inflation, but rather to inflation cumulat-
ed since the last wage revision.
Despite the information lags and the infrequency of the cost-
of-living adjustments, indexed contracts could approximately fix
the real wage by establishing trigger-point indexation, a type of
indexation in which wages are revised whenever accumulated in-
flation is larger than a given threshold. Similarly, indexed con-
tracts could effectively fix the real wage by specifying ex post
lump-sum payments between the parties so as to compensate them
for the differences between past and actual inflation. In practice,
however, trigger-point wage indexation seems to have been the
exception, and indexed contracts with ex post compensations for212 Esteban Jadresic
changes in inflation rates have not been reported. The fact that
actual indexed contracts do not attempt to really fix the real wage
might well be a consequence of the problems highlighted by the
literature on wage indexation to current prices.
Fischer (1977) was the first to attempt to formally model the
consequences of lagged wage indexation. However, the indexing
formula he examined in the main model of his paper is not the
usual indexation rule by which current wages are adjusted to past
inflation. Fischer assumed, rather, that indexed wages are set equal
to the one-period-ahead expectation of the price level. In conse-
quence, current wages in his model are adjusted according to the
difference between the one-period-ahead expectations on the cur-
rent and past price level. In the case of a two-period model, this
wage adjustment rule can be written as
where Pt–i is the price level in period t – i (i = 0, 1) and Et–j is the
expected value operator on the basis of information available at
the end of period t – j (j = 1, 2).
Fischer (1977) admits that the indexing formula he considers
in that paper (and in Fischer, 1985) might be a far cry from the
indexing formula used in practice. Thus it is not surprising that in
a later paper, Fischer (1988) introduces an alternative indexation
formula. His alternative formula, however, also differs from the
usual rule by which wages are adjusted according to lagged infla-
tion. Specifically, he considers contracts that last for two periods
and assumes that indexed wages during the second period of the
contract are set on the basis of the actual price level in the first
period of the contract. He further assumes that wages during the
first period of the contracts are set on the basis of the one-period-
ahead expectations of the price level during that period. This spec-
ification implies that the wage adjustment due to indexation in
period t is equal to the one-period-ahead prediction error of the
first period of the contract:
Thus the cost-of-living adjustment formula implied by this specifi-
cation also differs from the usual rule by which wages are adjusted
according to lagged inflation.
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Despite Fischer’s formal attempts to model lagged wage index-
ation, the best-known reference on wage indexation to lagged
inflation is probably Simonsen (1983). Simonsen’s approach is to
postulate a nominal wage adjustment rule of the form
where Gapt is the gap between actual and full-employment output
and  is a positive parameter. (For simplicity, I have dropped a
term measuring the change in labor productivity included in Simo-
nsen’s original specification.) Simonsen interprets the first term
of the right-hand side of equation 4 as the contribution of index-
ation to lagged inflation to the adjustment of wages, with  mea-
suring the degree of wage indexation.
Simonsen’s approach to wage indexation is used extensively in
the applied literature on wage indexation, frequently under the
assumption that  = 0. It is not clear how to interpret his model,
however, since equation 4 is not derived from an explicit analysis
of the implications of alternative wage contracts. For instance,
sizable empirical and analytical research is based on the assump-
tion that aggregate inflation is determined by an expression simi-
lar to the right-hand side of equation 4, in which the first and
second terms are denominated by the backward-looking and for-
ward-looking component of inflation, respectively. These models
often interpret the backward-looking component of inflation as
stemming from adaptive expectations rather than from indexation.
Alternatively, this component could stem from other characteris-
tics of the contracts and of the working of the economy. In Simon-
sen’s model, there is no specific reason why the comparison of
cases in which  = 1 or  > 0 with cases in which  = 0 would
necessarily indicate anything about the consequences of having
full or partial wage indexation versus no wage indexation.2
2. Below it becomes clear that the wage adjustment rule implied by the explicit
consideration of contracts with indexation clauses differs from equation 4. Indeed,
while the first term on the right-hand side could be interpreted under certain as-
sumptions as coming mainly from indexation clauses based on lagged inflation, the
remainder of equation 4 does not appropriately capture the effects on wages of peri-
odic contract renegotiation. One unappealing consequence of this specification prob-
lem is that according to equation 4, policymakers could maintain output permanently
above full employment by engineering a continuously rising inflation rate.
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Other models of lagged wage indexation have been developed
to analyze the consequences of centralized wage policies, but they
typically refer to case-specific rules. Morandé (1985), for example,
formally examines the consequences of a mandatory rule that im-
poses a floor on the base wage negotiated in collective agreements.
Such a wage rule was applied in Chile at the beginning of the 1980s,
but it was abolished in 1983.
1.3 Standards of Reference
Evaluating the consequences of wage indexation requires not
only specifying the nature of the adjustment of wages under index-
ation, but also defining the standard of reference against which those
consequences are measured. In Gray’s (1976) popular model, nonin-
dexed wages are wages that remain fixed in nominal terms during
the (only) period of reference. In Fischer’s (1977, 1985 and 1988)
analyses, in contrast, nonindexed wages correspond to wages that
were preset in nominal terms when the contracts were signed, but
that might be time varying. An example of this type of wage setting
can be found in the unionized sector of the U.S. labor market, where
three- or four-year contracts often specify a fixed wage increase
every year. The differences in the standards of reference that can
be used to evaluate the effects of wage indexation should be kept in
mind in considering the analysis in the following sections.
2. A MODEL OF WAGE INDEXATION TO
LAGGED INFLATION
While the models of wage indexation presented in the previous
section might be useful for some purposes, they do not model the
consequences of wage contracts indexed to lagged inflation. This
section presents a model that explicitly considers the consequenc-
es of this type of contract, as well as two models of nonindexed
wage contracts that define alternative standards of reference for
evaluating the effects of the indexed contracts. The analysis is
based on the models developed in Jadresic (1991). Bonomo and
García (1994) develop a model of wage indexation that is similar in
spirit, but that incorporates continuous time and contracts granting
only one cost-of-living adjustment during the life of each contract.215 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
They use their model to examine the effects of wage indexation dur-
ing disinflation; I refer to their results below.
2.1 A Model of Wage Contracts Indexed to
Lagged Inflation
This section focuses on the behavior of the aggregate wage. The
analysis takes the structure of the contracts as given and assumes
uniform staggering. Wage indexation is modeled explicitly as a con-
tract clause that grants periodic adjustments in the contract wage
according to a lagged value of the inflation cumulated since the last
wage revision.
As mentioned above, indexed wage contracts generally do not
provide full protection against fluctuations in the price level. Al-
though they stipulate periodic wage revisions that depend on actual
inflation, these revisions normally are not granted in every period
and are based on a lagged value of the inflation cumulated since the
previous wage adjustment. In Chile, for instance, where most wage
contracts are indexed, cost-of-living adjustments are typically grant-
ed every six months based on 100 percent of the inflation cumulated
since the last wage revision (Jadresic, 1992, 1995; Maturana, 1992;
García, 1995). In the United States, indexed wage contracts ob-
served in the unionized sector typically specify a quarterly or annu-
al cost-of-living adjustment, based on a fraction of the inflation
measured during the previous period (Hendricks and Kahn, 1985;
Kaufman and Woglom, 1986). Because of delays in the availability of
consumer price indexes, the cost-of-living adjustments in these coun-
tries are typically based on an n-month lagged value of cumulated
inflation, with n equal to one in the case of Chile and two or three in
the case of the United States.
To model the consequences of indexing wages to lagged infla-
tion, consider a group of wage contracts that last for N periods
and that contemplate cost-of-living adjustments based on 100
percent of past inflation every n periods. Suppose that these con-
tracts are renegotiated in a uniformly staggered fashion, and that
N/n is an integer larger than one, in accordance with what is
seen in actual indexed contracts. Brief reasoning implies that in
every period 1/N of the wages are renegotiated, 1/n – 1/N are
adjusted according to the indexation clause, and 1 – 1/n are kept
unchanged. If the cost-of-living adjustments are defined in terms216 Esteban Jadresic
of inflation cumulated between the last wage increase and the last
period before the adjustments, then the average wage increase in
period t is
where xt is the initial nominal increase of the wages renegotiated
at time t. The superscript I over wt denotes that this variable
measures the change in the aggregate wage when contracts are
indexed.
To complete the model of aggregate wage adjustment, one needs
to specify what determines xt. Extrapolating from simple studies
of lagged wage indexation, one might be tempted to simply as-
sume that the second term of the right-hand side of equation 5 is
either a positive function of the output gap or merely a constant.
If contracts are revised, however, xt must be agreed on in the
wage negotiations between firms and workers.
To model xt, I postulate that the outcome of the wage negotia-
tions maximizes the expected value of a quadratic function of the
average real wage implied by each contract.3 This specification
implies that the initial nominal wage of each contract is set so as
to make the expected value of the average real wage of the con-
tract equal to a target real wage, with the latter depending on the
wage setter’s expectations for the exogenous variables that enter
their objective function. If contracts that begin at time t are nego-
tiated with information on events that occurred up to time t – 1,
this can be written as xt is such that
3. The goal of maximizing a nonlinear function of the real wage is implied by
different microeconomic models of wage determination, including the union wage
model and the efficiency wage model. The specification of the maximand as a qua-
dratic function of the real wage is used to introduce expected variables in a log-linear
manner and can be interpreted as a second-order approximation of the actual objec-
tive function. The assumption that the average real wage, rather than its present
value, matters simplifies the algebra.
,
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where the right-hand expression represents the target real wage for
the contracts signed for period t to t + N – 1 based on information
available at the end of t – 1. To simplify comparisons made below,
this target real wage is specified as an average of period-specific
target real wages Et–1t+s between s = 0 and s = N – 1. Defining
precisely what determines the target real wage is not important
here; this issue will be addressed below.
Given the structure of the contracts, this specification for the
behavior of wage setters can be used to obtain expressions for xt,
as functions of past and current expectations about the target real
wage and inflation in different dates and as functions of past infla-
tion. The resulting expression can then be replaced in equation 5
to obtain an equation for aggregate wage adjustment. For space
reasons, the derivation is not presented here (see Jadresic, 1996,
for the derivation in the case n = 1). The general solution is
where                                                            and L is the standard
lag operator.
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation captures
the familiar link between current wage adjustments and past infla-
tion that is associated with wage indexation to lagged inflation. In
proportion 1/n – 1/N this term stems from the indexation clauses
contained in the contracts not revised during the reference period.
In proportion 1/N it also corresponds to a benchmark adjustment in
the revised wage contracts, with respect to which a “plus” or “minus”
initial adjustment is granted. In the aggregate, this term implies that
the elasticity of current wage adjustment with respect to an unex-
pected shock in the last period’s inflation rate is equal to 1/n.
The second term captures the effect of the initial wage revi-
sions. These revisions can break the mechanical link between ag-
gregate wage changes and past inflation. Whether this happens
depends on the wage setters’ target real wage and expected infla-
tion during the life of the new contracts, as compared to the tar-
get real wage and inflation expectations they held when they signed
the contracts that just ended. For example, if the inflation rate
expected (at t – 1) for the n periods to come rises relative to the
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inflation rate that was expected (at t – n – 1) for the last n periods,
then the aggregate wage will grow faster than past prices.
The second term on the right-hand side of equation 7 implies
that the elasticity of the current aggregate wage with respect to a
change in expected inflation is equal to (n + 1)/2N. (This assumes
that current and future inflation rates are all expected to change
by the same amount.) This elasticity would be zero if wage index-
ation were relative to the current price level: in that case all the
wage adjustments would be postponed until the changes in infla-
tion actually occurred. This is not the case here, however, because
with indexation to lagged inflation the anticipation of a permanent
increase in inflation reduces the expected real wage and leads wage
setters to grant larger initial wage increases; the size of this effect
is proportional to (n + 1)/2. The impact of this effect at the aggre-
gate level is multiplied by 1/N, as this effect is filtered by the
fraction of contracts negotiated in each period.
2.2 Alternative Standards of Reference
Because wage indexing helps to prevent the cost of too fre-
quent negotiations, in practice indexed wage contracts are long-
term contracts; for instance, the typical duration of indexed
contracts in the unionized sector of the U.S. labor market is three
years or more, and in Chile it is two years. Different standards of
reference can be used to evaluate the effects of these contracts.
One possibility is to compare the indexed wage contracts against
similarly long-term contracts that specify preset time-varying wag-
es during the life of each contract, like the nonindexed contracts
observed in the unionized sector of the U.S. labor market. Anoth-
er possibility is to compare these indexed wage contracts against
shorter-term contracts that specify a fixed wage during the life of
each contract, like the one-year contracts that seem more com-
mon in the rest of the world.
Contracts with Preset Time-Varying Wages
Consider first the case in which the nonindexed contracts specify
preset time-varying wages, such as Fischer’s (1977) nonindexed con-
tracts. In this case, wage setters can go beyond the attempt to achieve
an average expected real wage and instead target a specific real wage
for each period. With uniform staggering, this leads to219 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
where Et–st is the expected change in the target real wage be-
tween t – 1 and t according to information at t – s, and so forth.
The superscript P over wt is used to denote that the change in the
aggregate wage refers to contracts with preset time-varying
wages. Here the length of these contracts is assumed to be the
same as the length of the indexed contracts.
The first term on the right-hand side of equation 8 contains
the adjustment of wages stemming from the changes in expected
prices and the target real wage, according to the information that
was available at the time the contracts were signed. The second
term captures the effect of updating wages in the recently negoti-
ated contracts, which depends on the discrepancy between the
inflation rates and target real wages forecast in the previous ne-
gotiation with respect to their actual values.
In equation 8, the elasticity of the current aggregate wage with
respect to a shock in the previous period’s inflation rate is smaller
than before: 1/N rather than 1/n. Also, if n is larger than one, the
elasticity of the current aggregate wage with respect to a shock in
expected inflation is smaller: 1/N rather than (n + 1)/2N.
Contracts with Fixed Wages
Consider now the case of contracts in which wages remain fixed
during the term of the agreement, as in Taylor’s (1980) contracts.
The length of these contracts is denoted by M. If staggering is
uniform and if wage setters target an average real wage during
the life of each contract, it can be shown that
where the superscript F over wt denotes that the change in the
aggregate wage refers to contracts with fixed wages.
Equation 9 can be seen as a special case of equation 7 for in-
dexed contracts, one in which the indexation period and the length
of the contracts are identical and set equal to M. Accordingly, the
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first term on the right-hand side of this equation comes from a
catch-up wage increase granted in the revised contracts, which
compensates for the effect of inflation on the real value of the
wages agreed in the negotiations held M periods earlier. The
second term corresponds to the wage increase above or below the
catch-up term granted in the revised contracts.
There is the issue of defining the duration of the fixed wage
contracts used for comparison purposes. In practice, since the du-
ration of fixed wage contracts is usually shorter than the duration
of indexed wage contracts, it is most relevant to consider cases
where M < N. At the same time, since actual indexed contracts
typically specify indexation periods equal to or shorter than one
year, while the most common fixed wage contracts seem to have a
duration of one year, it seems more relevant to consider cases
where M  n. The research reviewed below focuses primarily on
such cases, often assuming M = N/2 and then exploring the conse-
quences of alternative assumptions when relevant for the purpos-
es at hand.
With this range for M, the elasticities of the current aggregate
wage with respect to expected and past inflation under fixed wage
contracts can be compared unambiguously with those under in-
dexed contracts. First, equation 9 implies that the response of the
current aggregate wage to the expectation of a permanent increase
in inflation is proportional to (M + 1)/2M, which for M  N is al-
ways larger than the corresponding response in the case of in-
dexed wage contracts. The intuition is that because fixed wage
contracts are front loaded and do not offer any cost-of-living ad-
justments during their term, these contracts tend to be much more
sensitive to changes in inflation expectations when they are rene-
gotiated. Second, equation 9 implies that the response of the cur-
rent aggregate wage to a shock in last period’s inflation rate is
proportional to 1/M, which for M  n is always smaller or equal to
the corresponding response in the case of indexed contracts.
Table 1 summarizes the elasticities of the current aggregate
wage in response of a shock in the previous period’s inflation rate
and to a shock in expected inflation implied by the alternative
wage contracts being considered.
The Target Real Wage
To model the determination of the target real wage, I have generally
assumed that wage setters target a real wage that is equiproportional221 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
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Table 1. Elasticity of the Current Aggregate Wagea
a. The signs in parenthesis indicate whether the elasticity is smaller than (–), larger than (+) or equal to (=) the
corresponding elasticity for contracts with indexed wages. It is assumed that n, N, and M are positive integers,
and that n  M < N.
In response to a shock in In response to a shock in
Type of contract  previous period’s inflation  expected inflation
Indexed wages 1/n (n + 1)/2N
Preset time-varying wages 1/N 1/N
( – ) (– or =)
Fixed wages 1/N (M+1)/2M
(– or =) (+)
to the expected level of aggregate output (which, under the implicit
assumption that the labor force is constant, is the same as the ex-
pected level of aggregate output per person in the labor force). For-
mally, this can be written as
where Yt+s is the level of aggregate output in period t + s.
This specification for the target real wage captures the intu-
ition that the real wage tends to increase when the labor market
becomes tighter and when the economy becomes richer. In addi-
tion, the specification is consistent with the theory and the empir-
ical evidence. From a theoretical perspective, for a given size of
the labor force, the assumption that the target real wage is pro-
portional to the level of output is consistent with a supply-wage
relation linking the real wage negatively with the rate of unem-
ployment. As emphasized by Blanchard and Katz (1997), such a
relation is implied by all the main modern approaches to wage de-
termination based on explicit maximization models, including the
matching approach, the efficiency wage approach, and the competi-
tive approach. From an empirical perspective, in turn, the assump-
tion that the target real wage is equiproportional to the expected
level of output ensures that the rate of unemployment and the
functional distribution of income in the models considered below
are constant in the steady state; these features conform with the
long-term evidence on these variables. Furthermore, the assump-
tion of equiproportionality between output and the target real wage222 Esteban Jadresic
is consistent with the extensive empirical evidence on the wage curve
compiled by Blanchflower and Oswald (1995).4
While this is a plausible specification for the target real wage,
the driving force for the results presented below lies in the differ-
ences in the elasticities of the aggregate wage with respect to past
and expected inflation implied by the different types of contract.
It seems unlikely, therefore, that the essence of those results would
be significantly altered by considering other plausible specifica-
tions for the target real wage. For instance, as noted below, as-
suming that the elasticity of the target real wage with respect to
output is different from one tends to make no difference in the
basic results.
3. WAGE INDEXATION AND THE COST OF DISINFLATION
It is apparent that the wage equations derived in the previous
section can have very different consequences from those implied
by the assumption that indexation is based on current inflation.
But what precisely are those consequences? This section examines
the effects of wage indexation on the cost of disinflation.
3.1 Money-Based Stabilization
There is a remarkable contrast between the views of academic
researchers and those of policymakers on the effects of wage index-
ation on the cost of disinflation. On the one hand, the standard aca-
demic presumption since Friedman (1974) has been that price
escalator clauses facilitate the end of inflation. This presumption is
based on the notion that indexation speeds up the adjustment of
wages to changes in inflation, and it is implied by the standard mod-
el of indexation to current inflation, as well as by the lagged wage
indexation models generated by Fischer (1985, 1988). On the other
4. Their central finding from data for a number of regions and periods is that a 1
percent increase in the unemployment rate typically reduces the real wage by about
0.1 percent (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995). With standard estimates for the Okun’s
Law coefficient of between 2 and 3 (for instance, see Adams and Coe, 1990) and an
unemployment rate on the order of 5 percent, their finding implies that a 1 percent
increase in aggregate output would raise the real wage on the order of 1 percent.223 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
hand, as highlighted by Simonsen (1983) and Williamson (1985),
policymakers have generally contended that wage indexation causes
inflationary inertia and thus makes disinflation more difficult. For
instance, the economic authorities in Chile recently pointed to wage
indexation to explain why faster disinflation was not possible in
the country, and wage indexing was prohibited in Argentina and
Brazil during recent stabilization programs.5
Until recently, the only published paper to explicitly evaluate
the consequences of indexation to lagged inflation during disinfla-
tion was Bonomo and García (1994).6 These authors replicate Ball’s
(1990) analysis of credible disinflation policies in a closed economy
with staggered fixed prices, but they expand the model by adding
an indexation rule according to which, at the midpoint of the peri-
od between successive price revisions, individual prices are ad-
justed by the inflation cumulated since the last price revision. As
in Ball’s earlier work, Bonomo and García (1994) find that certain
gradual disinflation policies could cause a boom in the economy if
they were credible; under indexation, however, the boom caused
by those policies would be followed by a recession, such that the
net output gain during the disinflation would be smaller in the
indexed economy than in the economy modeled by Ball. They also
estimate that the time necessary to reduce inflation without af-
fecting output would be longer in the indexed economy.
Bonomo and García’s findings suggest that wage indexation
could make disinflation harder. However, since their analysis fo-
cuses on gradual and credible policies that cause net booms rather
than net recessions, it really does not evaluate whether index-
ation makes disinflation more costly. Perhaps most important, the
paper provides no obvious explanation for the contrasting academic
and policymakers’ views on the effects of indexation on the cost of
disinflation.
To shed light on these issues, Jadresic (1996) examines the
costs of disinflation implied by wage equations similar to those
presented in the previous section. As in most of the prior litera-
ture, the paper focuses on the output loss caused by money-based
stabilization. Its results fully dispel the notion that wage index-
ation necessarily raises or lowers the cost of disinflation, and it
5. For a brief review of the literature on the effects of wage indexation on the
cost of disinflation, see the introduction in Jadresic (1996).
6. Formally, they referred to price indexation rather than wage indexation, but
this difference is insubstantial.224 Esteban Jadresic
provides a suitable explanation for the difference between the views
of academics and policymakers on the effects of wage indexation on
disinflation. The analysis shows that the cost of disinflation in an
economy with indexed wage contracts tends to be smaller than in
an economy with preset time-varying wage contracts, but larger
than in an economy with short-term fixed wage contracts. Thus it
turns out that the academic and policymakers’ views can both be
appropriate depending on the standard of reference used to eval-
uate the effects of wage indexation.7
To illustrate this result, figure 1 shows the behavior of output
and inflation implied by the wage equations 7, 8, and 9 after a
sudden reduction of money growth, under the simple assumptions
that price inflation is equal to wage inflation (t = wt), and that
aggregate output growth is determined by
where mt is the growth rate of money. The figure assumes that
the cut in money growth is unanticipated but permanent (equal to
0.01 in log terms) and that N = 4, n = 1. The short-term fixed wage
contracts assume M = N/2 = 2. (The less relevant case of M = N is
discussed in Jadresic, 2002; it is omitted here for space reasons.)
Figure 1 shows that the net output loss during disinflation is
largest when contracts specify preset time-varying wages, small-
est when contracts are short-term and specify fixed wages, and
intermediate when contracts contain indexation clauses. Note that
the cost of disinflation with indexed wage contracts appears to be
smaller than with preset time-varying wages.
Disinflation policies with more complex paths for the growth
rate of money can eliminate the boom shown above by the indexed
economy. For instance, with a monetary policy designed to obtain
a linear disinflation in the indexed economy, this economy dis-
plays no boom following the recovery but enjoys a faster disinfla-
tion and thus a faster recovery to full employment. The path of
7. This explanation accords with the fact that much of the academic literature
refers to the United States—where contracts with preset time-varying wages abound
in the unionized sector of the labor market and thus seem a relevant yardstick for
evaluating the effects of wage indexation—while the policymakers’ view alludes es-
sentially to other countries, where fixed wage contracts often provide a more appro-
priate standard of reference.
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output and inflation during disinflation can also differ from the
one depicted in figure 2 for several other reasons, including if there
is only partial credibility, if the disinflation is anticipated, if there
is a procyclical ratio between prices and wages, if the real wage
targeted by wage setters depends on output with an elasticity dif-
ferent from unity, if money demand is interest elastic, and if the
economy is open. (The latter case is shown in figure 2, using the
model and base case parameters presented below.) The analysis in
Jadresic (1996) indicates, however, that the ranking of disinflation
costs mentioned above is quite robust under these alternative cir-
cumstances: the net output loss during the disinflation tends to be
smaller in the indexed economy than in the economy with preset
time-varying wage contracts and larger than in the economy with
short-term fixed wage contracts.
What is the source of the discrepancies in the behavior of the
economies with and without indexation? The answer to this ques-
tion lies in the different elasticities for the current aggregate wage
implied by the contracts under consideration.

















































Compare first the elasticities of the aggregate wage under in-
dexed wage contracts with the elasticities of the aggregate wage
under contracts that specify preset time-varying wages. As noted
above and shown in table 1, the elasticity of the aggregate wage in
response to changes in the past period’s inflation rate is always
larger when wages are indexed. During disinflation, this feature
implies that once initial reductions in the inflation rate have been
achieved, the existence of indexation feeds a larger part of those
reductions back into wages and inflation in following periods. In
comparison with an economy featuring contracts that specify pre-
set time-varying wages, this enhanced feedback from recent infla-
tion to current inflation can permit a faster recovery, create a
boom following the recession, or prevent a larger drop of output
during the recession caused by the cut in money growth. As a
result, the output cost of disinflation in the indexed economy tends
to be smaller.
The favorable consequence of indexation for the cost of disin-
flation due to the effect just described can be reinforced if the
indexation period is longer than the basic period in which the
preset time-varying wages are kept fixed (in the model, if n > 1).
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If this is the case, the aggregate wage under indexation is not only
more responsive to past inflation, but also more responsive to chang-
es in expected inflation. In comparison with an economy charac-
terized by preset time-varying wages, this effect directly helps to
break the inflationary inertia in the indexed economy at the begin-
ning of the disinflation and, as a result, also helps to reduce the
output cost of disinflation.8
Compare now the elasticities of the aggregate wage under in-
dexed wage contracts with the elasticities of the aggregate wage
under fixed wage contracts. As noted above and shown in table 1,
the elasticity of the aggregate wage in response to a shock in ex-
pected inflation is always smaller when wages are indexed. This
implies that wage indexation makes it harder to break the initial
inflationary inertia of the economy and thus it tends to deepen the
recession associated with a sudden reduction in money growth.
Unless some other force dominates, it follows that wage index-
ation raises the cost of disinflation when indexed wage contracts
are compared with fixed wage contracts.
Note, however, that the elasticity of the aggregate wage in
response to the past period’s inflation rate is larger when wages
are indexed if the length of the fixed wage contracts used as the
standard of reference is longer than the length of the indexation
period, for instance, if the fixed wage contracts have the same
duration as the indexed contracts. This observation raises the ques-
tion of whether, in this case, the enhanced feedback from past to
current inflation caused by wage indexation can more than com-
pensate for the adverse effect of indexation on the cost of disinfla-
tion caused by the smaller responsiveness of wages to the expected
disinflation. In Jadresic (1996), I find that this can be the case if
the fixed wage contracts used as the standard of comparison have
the same duration as the indexed wage contracts and if the econo-
my is such that early in the disinflation there is a sizable fall in
prices independent of wages—stemming, for instance, from a large
appreciation of the domestic currency or a sharp drop in marginal
costs. However, when the standard of reference is a fixed wage
contract half as long as the indexed contract and twice as long of
the indexation period, the result that wage indexation raises the
cost of disinflation emerges unchanged in the simulations, even in
the case of disinflation with sizable initial falls in prices independent
8. This effect is not considered in Jadresic (1996), which assumes n = 1.228 Esteban Jadresic
of wages. More generally, of course, the basic result can always be
preserved by using a standard of reference based on short-term
fixed wage contracts whose length is equal to or shorter than the
indexation period of the indexed contracts.9
To summarize, wage indexation can raise or lower the net out-
put loss caused by money-based stabilization depending on the stan-
dard of reference. In comparison with contracts specifying preset
time-varying wages, indexed wage contracts reduce the cost of
disinflation; this is mainly because indexation establishes an auto-
matic feedback from past to current inflation that facilitates dis-
inflation once initial reductions in inflation have been achieved. In
comparison with short-term contracts specifying fixed wages, in
turn, indexed wage contracts tend to raise the cost of disinflation
because indexation reduces the responsiveness of wages during
the early stages of disinflation.
3.2 Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization
The theoretical literature on wage indexation dedicates little
specific attention to the effects of wage indexation during exchange-
rate-based inflation stabilization.10 In this case, however, the Gray
(1976) model clearly implies that wage indexation would make dis-
inflation easier. For example, with full wage indexation to current
inflation, pegging the exchange rate should stop inflation abruptly
and without costs. As in the case of money-based disinflation, this
9. To provide an example of the relative elasticities of indexed and fixed wage
contracts, consider the case of Chile. Typical indexed wage contracts last for twenty-
four months and have an indexation period of six months (with 100 indexation to
lagged inflation); the implied elasticities of the current aggregate wage with respect
to the inflation rate in the past period and expected inflation are 0.167 and 0.146,
respectively. Suppose that the alternative to these contracts are fixed wage contracts
that last for twelve months. In this case, the elasticities of the current aggregate
wage with respect to inflation in the past period and to expected inflation are 0.083
and 0.542, respectively. Thus the elasticity of the aggregate wage with respect to past
inflation for the indexed contracts is twice as large as the same elasticity for the fixed
wage contracts, and the elasticity of the aggregate wage with respect to expected
inflation for the indexed contracts is close to one-fourth of the same elasticity for the
fixed wage contracts.
10. A sizable theoretical literature addresses the relation between wage index-
ation and monetary and exchange rate policies in open economies, but this literature
focuses on other issues (see next section and the surveys listed in the opening para-
graph). This gap contrasts with the significant attention that exchange-rate-based
stabilization has received elsewhere in the academic literature since the early 1980s.
For a review and assessment of the different approaches used in the latter literature,
see Rebelo and Végh (1995).229 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
prediction again stands in sharp contrast with the view of policy-
makers and applied observers, who tend to believe that wage index-
ation makes disinflation harder during exchange-rate-based
stabilization. For instance, the ban on wage indexation in Brazil and
Argentina mentioned above was implemented in a context of ex-
change-rate-based stabilization plans.11
This section explores whether the consequences of wage index-
ation during a money-based stabilization described above also apply
in the context of an exchange-rate-based stabilization. The analysis is
based on a Mundell-Fleming economy characterized by a domestic
and a foreign good that are imperfect substitutes and by a domestic
and a foreign bond that are perfect substitutes. The notation for the
variables in this economy is as follows: yt measures the growth rate
of aggregate domestic output; pt is the rate of change in the price of
the domestic good in terms of domestic currency; t denotes the in-
flation rate; i t represents the nominal interest rate of the domestic
bond; mt is the growth rate of the domestic money supply; and st
indicates the devaluation rate of the domestic currency. It is assumed
that foreign variables are constant in level. The following relations
hold in this economy:
where 	,
,,, and are nonnegative parameters.
Equations 12 through 16 represent, respectively, the principle
of effective demand in the market for the domestic good, the money
11. The policymaker’s view is often illustrated with the aid of Simonsen’s (1983)
wage equation described above, under the assumption that  = 0, and an additional
inflation equation of the type t = wt + (1 – )st, where st is the devaluation rate of
the domestic currency and  is a parameter between zero and one (see Edwards, 1996,
for a recent example). This framework directly implies that pegging the exchange
rate when wages are indexed reduces inflation slowly and at the cost of a real apprecia-
tion (because it implies t = t-1 and st – t = –t-1). As noted above, however, this
approach does not permit an explicit comparison of the effects of indexed and
nonindexed wage contracts, and thus it should only be considered as illustrative of
the policymaker’s concern.
    , E L 1 1 t t t t t t p s i y           (12)
  , L 1 t t t t i y m       (13)
, t t t y w p    (14)
, E 1   t t t s i (16)
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market equilibrium condition, the pricing equation for the domes-
tic good, the definition of inflation as a weighted average of the
rate of change in the price of domestic and foreign goods in do-
mestic currency, and the uncovered interest parity condition for
the domestic and the foreign bonds. Equations 12 and 15 implicitly
assume the law of one price for the foreign good.
Figure 3 combines equations 12 through 16 with the wage equa-
tions presented above to show the effects of an unanticipated, cred-
ible reduction in the devaluation rate. The economy is assumed to
have been in a steady state with persistent inflation before the
new policy is implemented, at time t = 1. The output path depicted
for each type of contract corresponds to a base case in which 	 = 0,
which captures the stylized fact that output does not have strong
effects on prices, given wages (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, pp.
464-67). This base case also assumes 
 = 0.5,  = 0.3,  = 0.5, and
 = 0.7, which are comparable in order of magnitude with those
considered by Fischer (1988) and Henderson and McKibbin (1993).
Also, the base simulations assume N = 4 and n = 1, with the short-
term fixed wage contracts half as long as the indexed contracts.
The experiment considers a reduction in the rate of devaluation
equal to 0.01 in log terms.
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Figure 3 shows that with the base-case parameters, the basic
outcome of a sudden reduction of the rate of devaluation is a reces-
sion. This result is similar to that found for a money-based stabiliza-
tion, although now the overall output loss is smaller (compare figure
3 with figure 2; see also table 2) and in the case of contracts with
preset time-varying wages, the economy experiences a short-lived
initial boom. Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, the
figure suggests that the ranking of the disinflation costs is the same
as in the case of a money-based stabilization; that is, the largest net
output loss occurs when contracts specify preset time-varying wag-
es, the smallest occurs when contracts are short-term and specify
fixed wages, and an intermediate level occurs when contracts are
indexed. This perception is confirmed by the numerical net output
loss reported in the first row of table 2.
To clarify this result, figures 4 and 5 consider two special cases
that permit the separation of the two channels through which the
Base modelb  1.32  1.69  0.76
 = 0  1.26  1.58  0.54
= 0  0.35  0.35  0.35
 = 1  1.50  1.89  1.61
 = 0,  = 1  0.70  0.70  0.70
 = 1  3.75  5.03  1.99
= 0.5  1.08  1.47  0.64
 = 0.5  1.16  1.64  0.69
N = 2  0.77  0.81  0.55
N = 2,  = 0  0.35  0.35  0.35
N = 8  2.63  4.91  1.45
N = 8,  = 0  0.35  0.35  0.35
Net output loss during money-based stabilizationc
Base modelb 1.80  2.72  1.01
Table 2. Net Output Loss during Exchange-Rate-
Based Stabilizationa
a. Sum of log deviation of output from steady-state level in response to a reduction in the devaluation rate of
0.01 in log term (x 100).
b. Assumes  = 0,  = 0.5,  = 0.3,  = 0.5,  = 0.7, N = 4, and n = 1.
c. Sum of log deviation of output from steady-state level in response to a reduction in money growth of 0.01 in
log term (x 100).
Preset time-varying
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exchange-rate-based stabilization affects aggregate demand. First,
figure 4 shows that when demand responds only to the real ex-
change rate (
 = 0), the exchange-rate-based stabilization causes a
recession. This is because the gradual adjustment of wages and
inflation causes the reduction of the devaluation rate to trigger a
temporary real appreciation of the domestic currency, which re-
duces the demand for domestic output during the adjustment pro-
cess. Second, figure 5 shows that when demand responds only to
the real interest rate ( = 0), the exchange-rate-based stabilization
can cause a boom-recession cycle, as noted by Rodriguez (1982)
and Dornbusch (1982). This is because the fixing of the exchange
rate can reduce the real interest rate during the early stages of
the disinflation—as it fixes the nominal interest rate in an infla-
tionary context—which must fall below its steady-state level to
reestablish the equilibrium real exchange rate.
The evaluation of the net output losses with and without wage
indexation in these two special cases is revealing. When aggregate
demand depends only on the real exchange rate, the ranking of
Figure 4. Output during Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization:
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these losses is as above; that is, indexed wage contracts reduce the
cost of disinflation relative to preset time-varying wage contracts
and increase it relative to short-term fixed wage contracts (second
row of table 2). When aggregate demand depends only on the real
interest rate, in turn, the net output losses are identical regardless
of the type of wage contracts prevailing in the economy (third row
of table 2). This implies that wage indexation influences the cost of
disinflation only through its effect on the size of the real apprecia-
tion of the domestic currency. Inasmuch as the elasticity of the
aggregate wage to the expected disinflation is larger when contracts
are indexed than when contracts specify preset time-varying wag-
es, it is not surprising that indexed wage contracts reduce the cost
of disinflation relative to those contracts. By a similar reasoning, it
is not surprising that indexed contracts increase the cost of disin-
flation relative to short-term fixed wage contracts.
This paper offers no general proof that the above finding should
always obtain, but the simulation results reported in table 2 suggest
that this finding is robust to alternative parameter specifications.
More generally, it seems clear that to the extent that output is
Figure 5. Output during Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization:
















































adversely affected by a real appreciation of the domestic curren-
cy, the basic effect of wage indexation described in the previous
paragraph will be preserved. I thus conclude that the qualitative
effects of wage indexation on the cost of disinflation under an ex-
change-rate-based stabilization are likely to be similar to those un-
der a money-based stabilization: indexed wage contracts tend to
lower the cost of disinflation relative to preset time-varying wage
contracts and raise it relative to short-term fixed wage contracts.
4. WAGE INDEXATION AND OUTPUT STABILITY
The previous section examined the consequences of wage in-
dexation in the context of a change in policy regime, characterized
by a change in the growth rate of money or in the devaluation
rate. Most of the academic literature on wage indexation, howev-
er, focuses on the consequences of wage indexation when the econ-
omy is hit by exogenous shocks, for a given policy regime. This
section reviews the effects of wage indexation to lagged inflation
in such a context, focusing on its impact on output stability.
4.1 The Gray-Fischer Proposition Revisited
Despite the sizable literature that has accumulated on the top-
ic, the major academic proposition on wage indexation continues
to be that originally stated by Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977): in-
dexing wages stabilizes output when shocks are nominal and de-
stabilizes output when shocks are real. Following Gray, the
standard argument in support of this proposition hinges on the
assumption that wage indexation is based on current inflation. Fis-
cher’s analysis of the lagged indexation rule described by equation
2 also supports this proposition. While Fischer admits that such
an indexing formula may be a far cry from the indexing formula
used in practice and mentions that indexing to lagged inflation
could modify his conclusion that wage indexation stabilizes output
in the face of nominal shocks if shocks are transitory, he conjec-
tures that if the nominal shocks are permanent, his basic conclu-
sion should be preserved. He does not address this issue formally.
In Jadresic (2002), I reexamine the effects of wage indexation
on output stability in an economy similar to that considered by Gray
and Fischer, but using wage equations similar to the ones derived235 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
above. Following their analysis, I consider a closed economy in
which the exchange rate plays no important role and focus mainly
on the case in which the policy regime features a fixed money
supply. To solve the problem analytically, I also assume that in-
dexed and preset time-varying wage contracts have a duration of
two periods, while fixed-wage contracts have a duration of one
period, equal to the indexation period. For comparison, Gray’s con-
tracts are one-period contracts, while Fischer’s contracts are two-
period contracts in the case of nonindexed contracts and an
undetermined number of periods in the case of indexed contracts.
The main result stemming from Jadresic (2002) is that in Gray
and Fischer’s economy, wage indexation to lagged inflation tends
to destabilize output regardless of whether shocks are nominal or
real. This appears to be true both when indexed wage contracts
are compared with short-term fixed wage contracts and, under
plausible parameter values, when they are compared with preset
time-varying wage contracts.
To illustrate this result, consider an economy in which the rate of
change of aggregate output is determined by the rate of change of
the real money supply and a nominal shock vt that is independent
and serially uncorrelated, with mean zero and variance v
2. This shock
can be interpreted as a permanent, unanticipated shock reduction in
money demand. Given the assumption that the monetary authority
follows a fixed money supply rule, this specification implies that
Also assume that inflation is determined by the simple relationship
where ut is a real shock at period t, assumed to be independent
and serially uncorrelated, with mean zero and varianceu
2. This
shock can be interpreted as an unexpected and permanent increase
in the level of productivity.12
Equations 17 and 18 can be solved for each type of contract by
combining them with the corresponding wage equation, with N = 2
, t t t u w    (18)
12. This is a simplified version of the inflation equation considered in Jadresic (2002),
which in addition includes the term (yt – ut ) in its right-hand side, where  is the elastic-
ity of prices, given wages. This term is omitted here for simplicity, as the stylized fact
seems to be  0 (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, pp. 464–67). See the discussion below.
. vt t t y     (17)236 Esteban Jadresic
and n = M = 1, and making the rational expectations assumption
that the policy regime of a fixed money supply is well known and
that actors know the structure of the economy. The paper’s main
interest here is the behavior of the output gap (Gapt ), which is
defined as the difference between the actual and the frictionless
level of output, with the latter being the level of output that would
be observed if wages were fully flexible and the current shocks were
fully observable.13 Solving for this variable leads to the following
stochastic difference equations:
where the meaning of the superscripts is obvious.
The behavior of the output gap in response to real and a nominal
shocks implied by these equations is depicted in figures 6 and 7. Con-
sider first the case of a nominal shock. The initial impact of such a
shock is identical regardless of the type of wage contract. This result
arises because, independently of the type of contract considered,
wages in any given period are predetermined. Consequently, a posi-
tive shock vt tends to increase real money balances and output iden-
tically. Because of the assumption that prices do not respond directly
to output, inflation is not modified at the time of the impact and
output increases precisely by the amount of the shock.
In subsequent periods, the effects of a nominal shock do
depend on the nature of the contracts in the economy. The quick-
est adjustment of output to equilibrium occurs when short-term
fixed wage contracts prevail; in this case the initial expansion of
output lasts only for the period of the impact. When preset time-
varying wage contracts prevail, one-half of the initial expansion of
output persists one period after the impact; thereafter the econo-
my rests in equilibrium. Finally, in the case of indexed contracts,
three-fifths of the initial expansion of output persists one period
13. In the model presented here, the frictionless level of output is proportional to
the level of productivity. Indeed, with fully adjusting wages and perfect information,
wage setters would set wt = t + yt; this equation and equation 18 together imply that
the rate of change of the frictionless level of output is ut.
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Figure 6. Output Effects of a Nominal Shock in a Closed




















































Figure 7. Output Effects of a Real Shock in a Closed




















































after the shock; thereafter output converges to its equilibrium
through an oscillatory process that rapidly fades away.14
Any reasonable measure of instability demonstrates that these
results imply an unambiguous overall effect of wage indexation on
the response of output to the nominal shock: wage indexation de-
stabilizes output. What is the intuition? In comparison with short-
term fixed wage contracts, indexed wage contracts imply a slower
return of output to its equilibrium level; that is, the indexation
clauses do not provide a mechanism to compensate for the fact
that with longer contracts, a smaller fraction of wages are revised
in every period. In comparison with preset time-varying wage con-
tracts, the reason is more subtle: since the indexation clauses au-
tomatically transmit part of the increase in wages and inflation
from one period to the other, wage setters respond to a positive
nominal shock to the economy by anticipating that in subsequent
periods inflation will stay temporarily above the trend and that
real money balances and output will continue to fall; the anticipation
of falling output moderates the adjustment of wages and inflation
during the first period after the impact, which slows down the econo-
my’s adjustment and causes the initial expansion of output to persist.
Consider now the case of a real shock. As shown in figure 7,
such a shock has no impact on the output gap in the period in which
it affects the economy. Given that in any single period wages are
predetermined, a positive real shock, ut, reduces prices proportion-
ally and increases real money balances and output exactly by the
same magnitude as the size of the shock. Because output and the
frictionless level of output increase by the same amount, the output
gap remains unaltered. While this result differs from the expansive
effect implied by the positive nominal shock considered above, this
outcome again does not depend on the type of contract considered.
In subsequent periods, output remains in equilibrium under
short-term fixed and preset time-varying wage contracts, but with
indexed wage contracts, output is destabilized: there is a boom
in the first period after the shock, and thereafter output converg-
es gradually to its equilibrium level. The boom occurs because
the reduction in the inflation rate in the period of the shock is
transmitted automatically into an inflation rate that is lower than
14. The oscillatory and convergent nature of the evolution of output can be veri-
fied by computing the roots of the characteristic equation implied by equation 19,
which are imaginary and have the property that the multiplication of their inverses is
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the trend in the next period; this effect raises real money balances
and expands output despite the fact that no additional shocks have
occurred (in the simple model considered here, the size of the
output gap in the period following the shock is two-fifths of the
magnitude of the shock). In the next period, upward pressure on
wages increases inflation and moves real money balances and output
toward their equilibrium levels. Thereafter, output converges to its
equilibrium after a sequence of oscillations that gradually fade away.15
In the context of Gray and Fischer’s specific closed-economy model,
Jadresic (2002) shows that the findings that wage indexation to lagged
inflation generally destabilizes output tend to be robust to consider-
ing a more general inflation equation, which allows for a direct effect
of output on prices, given wages. For nominal shocks, the caveat is
that if this effect is positive and strong enough, wage contracts in-
dexed to lagged inflation can stabilize output relative to preset time-
varying wage contracts—although they would continue to destabilize
output relative to short-term fixed wage contracts. In the case of real
shocks, wage indexation would always be destabilizing.
These findings are not robust, however, to alternative assump-
tions about the nature of the economy. As discussed in the following
section, considering an open economy can fully reverse these find-
ings. Allowing for alternative monetary policies can also have signif-
icant effects. For instance, the analysis in Jadresic (2002) shows
that if money supply is indexed to lagged inflation rather than being
fixed, the variability of output with indexed wage contracts is re-
duced to the same level as the variability of output with contracts
that specify preset time-varying wages under a fixed money supply.
One implication of this result is that even if the economy is hit only
by real shocks, wage indexation does not necessarily destabilize out-
put. Of course, the drawback of indexing the money supply is that
such a policy dramatically destabilizes inflation.
4.2 Output Stability in the Open Economy
Analyzing the effects of wage indexation on output stability in
a closed economy can be useful for academic purposes, and it can
be appropriate for understanding the behavior of economies with
15. As in the case of a nominal shock, this process of adjustment can be verified
by computing the roots of the characteristic equation associated with equation 19.240 Esteban Jadresic
a small external sector or with a financial sector that is poorly inte-
grated into the international financial markets and that applies a
crawling peg. For most countries today, however, it would be more
relevant to discuss the effects of wage indexation in the context of
an open economy. I do so in Jadresic (1998), with the help of the
simple model presented above for analyzing exchange-rate-based
stabilization. This section reviews some of the implications of that
analysis. Since the focus now is not only on evaluating the overall
effects of wage indexation on output stability, but also on exploring
more generally the effects of wage indexation on output behavior, I
start by providing some background.
The literature on international macroeconomics demonstrates
substantial agreement on the behavior of an open economy hit by
aggregate shocks under perfect capital mobility and simple nomi-
nal price or wage rigidities. The basic common principles are con-
tained in the Mundell-Fleming results, according to which a
monetary shock destabilizes output when the exchange rate floats
but does not affect it when the exchange rate is fixed, while a
shock on the demand for goods destabilizes output more when the
exchange rate is fixed than when it floats. More generally, there is
a consensus that in a conventional open economy, the response of
output and other macroeconomic variables to aggregate shocks
depends crucially on the exchange rate regime in place.16
According to the literature on wage indexation, however, index-
ing wages can cause the behavior of an open economy to be very
different from that just described.17 The sharpest contrast arises
under the assumption of full wage indexation, in which case nomi-
nal wages are assumed to move proportionally with the current
price level and the real wage is thus deemed fixed. In conventional
models a fixed real wage makes the level of output independent
from nominal variables, and it follows that in this case the Mundell-
Fleming results cease to hold: monetary shocks do not affect output
even if the exchange rate is flexible, while shocks on the demand for
goods affect output identically with a fixed and a floating exchange
16. The seminal references on the behavior of an open economy with nominal
rigidities are Fleming (1962), Mundell (1963), and Dornbusch (1976). A useful survey
of the related literature can be found in Marston (1985). For an analysis using a
representative agent framework, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
17. On the effects of wage indexation in open economies, in addition to the general
surveys on wage indexation mentioned in the introduction, see Genberg (1989), Argy
(1990), and Turnovsky (1995).241 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
rate. More generally, full wage indexation would make the exchange
rate regime totally irrelevant for output behavior.18
Once the lags in actual indexation rules are taken into account,
however, it becomes apparent that wage indexation does not have
the effects mentioned in the previous paragraph. The analysis in
Jadresic (1998) confirms this presumption. By running simulations
based on the open economy model and on the wage equations pre-
sented in the previous sections, the paper finds that when the lags
in actual indexation are considered, wage indexation to lagged in-
flation affects output behavior substantially less than posited by
the previous academic literature. In particular, wage indexation
does not appear to invalidate or modify the Mundell-Fleming re-
sults or to blur the behavior of output across exchange rate re-
gimes. Rather, the response of output to a variety of shocks appears
to be qualitatively similar and of the same order of magnitude
regardless of the type of contract prevailing in the economy.
These results are illustrated in figures 8 and 9. These figures
show the response of output to a monetary and a demand shock
implied by the open economy model of the previous section and
the wage equations presented above. The shocks correspond to a
permanent, unexpected reduction in the demand for money and a
permanent, unexpected increase in aggregate demand for the do-
mestic output, respectively. As before, the simulations assume that
the respective policy regime and the structure of the economy are
well known by the actors. The floating exchange rate regime cor-
responds to the assumption mt = 0, and the fixed exchange rate
regime to st = 0. The shocks are equivalent to 0.01 in log terms and
the parameter values are those of the base case already defined.
Consider first the case of a monetary shock. The top panel of
figure 8 shows the response of output when the exchange rate floats.
Output tends to expand temporarily regardless of the type of con-
tract prevailing in the economy. The basic reasons are familiar.
18. When the academic literature refers to partial wage indexation, the
contrast with the conventional predictions are less acute, but qualitatively the differences
remain. In this case, nominal wages are taken to move less than proportionally with the
current price level, but the real wage is still assumed to be more rigid than without wage
indexation. In standard models, this increased real wage rigidity lessens the effects of mon-
etary shocks on output when the exchange rate is flexible, and it dampens the effect of
shocks in the demand for goods on output when the exchange rate is fixed. The general
proposition is that the larger the degree of wage indexation, the smaller are the differences
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First, the monetary shock reduces nominal interest rates and raises
expected inflation, cutting down expected real interest rates. Sec-
ond, the shock depreciates the domestic currency, which increas-
es the competitiveness of the economy given predetermined wages
and prices. Both effects tend to boost demand and output.
The top panel of figure 8 clearly shows that wage indexation to
lagged inflation does not insulate output from the monetary shock.
This result is partly explained by the fact that with wages indexed
to lagged inflation, the depreciation of the domestic currency
caused by the monetary shock affects future wages but does not
affect current wages. Because of this initial predetermination of
wages, the temporary rise in the competitiveness of the economy
and the temporary reduction in expected real interest rates occur
despite the existence of wage indexation. In principle, however,
the evolution of indexed and nonindexed wages following the peri-
od of the shock could be sufficiently different as to substantially
alter the behavior of output, both during and after the shock. In
this regard, the top panel of figure 8 shows that, perhaps not sur-
prisingly, the adjustment of output to its steady-state level takes
longer with indexed contracts than with short-term fixed wage
contracts. Also, output with indexed contracts does not stabilize
completely once all contracts have been revised; it converges cy-
clically to the steady-state level. In all cases, however, the overall
response of output to the monetary shock is qualitatively similar,
and the effects are comparable in order of magnitude.
Nonetheless, does indexing wages to lagged inflation at least
help to reduce its variability? The simulations for alternative
parameter values in Jadresic (1998) indicate that the answer is
ambiguous and depends crucially on the specific characteristics of
the economy. The ambiguity is closely related to the size of the
depreciation of the domestic currency due to the monetary shock
and its initial impact on prices and inflation. If these effects are
large enough, the indexation clauses imply a relatively large adjust-
ment of wages in the period after the shock occurs, and indexed
wage contracts can contribute to accelerating the process of adjust-
ing wages, prices, and output. If these effects are small—for in-
stance, because the weight of foreign goods in the CPI is low or
because aggregate demand is very sensitive to the real interest rate
or the real exchange rate—then indexed contracts can destabilize
output. Because indexed wage contracts automatically feed back
part of the initial increase in wages and inflation to subsequent243 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
periods, they tend to reduce expected real interest rates and thus
make the initial expansion of output more persistent. In addition,
indexed contracts tend to generate excessive cumulated inflation in
later periods, which elevates nominal and real interest rates, re-
duces competitiveness, and can drive output below its steady-state
level. Both effects work to increase the variability of output.
Figure 9 shows the case of a shock in the demand for the do-
mestic good. Given the nominal rigidity introduced by the wage
Figure 8. Output Effects of a Monetary Shock in
an Open Economy
Period









































































































contracts, the increase in demand causes a temporary boom in
output. Moreover, in line with the Mundell-Fleming results, the
magnitude of this boom is significantly smaller when the exchange
rate floats than when the exchange rate is fixed. The reason is
that the long-term real appreciation required by the economy in
order to accommodate the demand shock is attained differently
depending on the exchange rate regime. With a fixed exchange
rate, the real appreciation is achieved through an increase in wages
Figure 9. Output Effects of a Demand Shock in
an Open Economy
Period
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and inflation in the periods following the shock. This process tem-
porarily reduces expected real interest rates and achieves the real
appreciation only gradually; these effects work to destabilize out-
put during the period of adjustment. With a floating exchange rate,
in turn, most of the required real appreciation is attained through
a nominal appreciation at the time of the shock. This nominal ap-
preciation helps to stabilize output, both by shifting demand out of
the domestic good more quickly and by putting less pressure on
wages and inflation as a vehicle for adjustment, which helps to
stabilize expected real interest rates.
For this paper, the most important result is that the order of
magnitude of the output boom caused by the demand shock does
not depend on whether the wages are indexed or not. While the
alternative types of wage contract under consideration do imply
some differences in the behavior of output during the adjustment
process, those differences are relatively minor, and they do not
change the fact that a floating exchange rate substantially moder-
ates the response of output to the shock. The relatively small ef-
fect of wage indexation on output behavior is again partly due to
the fact that, regardless of the type of wage contract prevailing in
the economy, wages are predetermined at the time the shock oc-
curs. In addition, the top panel of figure 9 shows that the differ-
ences in the behavior of output are minor even when the different
dynamics associated with the alternative types of contract are ful-
ly considered.
Does wage indexation have any tendency to destabilize the be-
havior of output in response to a demand shock when the exchange
rate floats and to stabilize it when the exchange rate is fixed? In
the case of a floating exchange rate, the top panel of figure 8 and
the simulations for alternative parameter values in Jadresic (1998)
indicate that wage indexation does tend to destabilize output. In
this case, and for almost all parameter values considered, the vari-
ance of output with indexed wage contracts is larger than with
preset time-varying wage contracts and with short-term fixed wage
contracts. The reason is that in the periods immediately after the
shock occurs, the indexation clauses quickly feed back into wages
the lower inflation due to the initial appreciation, which tends to
curb or even reduce them. This effect works first to moderate the
magnitude of the real appreciation and then to reduce the expect-
ed real interest rate, as demanders anticipate that wages and in-
flation will have to accelerate in the future in order to compensate246 Esteban Jadresic
the unnecessary cutback of current wages. Consequently, with a
floating exchange rate, the output boom caused by the demand shock
tends to persist longer when contracts are indexed, which destabiliz-
es output.
In the case of a fixed exchange rate, the analysis in Jadresic
(1998) indicates that wage indexation has no clear-cut effect on
the output response to a demand shock. Two parameters that are
especially important in determining whether wage indexation raises
or reduces this response are the elasticities of the demand for the
domestic good with respect to the expected real interest rate and
with respect to the real exchange rate. This is because wage in-
dexation slows down the adjustment of wages and inflation, which
tends to moderate the initial fall in expected real interest rates
but to reduce the speed of the real appreciation required to
reestablish equilibrium. While the former effect is stabilizing, the
latter is destabilizing. Depending on the specific elasticities of the
demand for the domestic good, wage indexation can either stabi-
lize or destabilize output.
Jadresic (1998) also considers the effects of price shocks and
productivity shocks. The analysis confirms that the effects of wage
indexation to lagged inflation on output behavior are relatively
small. Also, the results indicate that wage indexation is likely to
destabilize output when shocks are in prices and that it has an
ambiguous effect when shocks are in productivity.
To summarize, once the lags in actual indexation are taken
into account, wage indexation in the open economy affects the be-
havior of output substantially less than posited in the previous
literature. Also, the net effects of wage indexation on output sta-
bility in this context are ambiguous. For instance, if the economy
is hit mainly by price shocks, wage indexation is likely to destabi-
lize output. The same is bound to happen if the economy is hit
mostly by shocks in the demand for goods and there is a floating
exchange rate. However, if the economy is hit mainly by monetary
or productivity shocks, or if it is hit mainly by demand shocks and
there is a fixed exchange rate, the net effects of wage indexation
are ambiguous and depend on the economy’s parameter values.
The overall implication is that a definite evaluation of the net ef-
fects of wage indexation on output stability in the open economy
requires a precise specification of the economy under consider-
ation, an issue which requires further research.247 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
5. FURTHER MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WAGE INDEXATION
The previous sections focused on the consequences of wage
indexation for the behavior of output. The above analysis, howev-
er, also has implications on other variables and issues. This sec-
tion explores some of those implications, comparing them with the
implications of the standard approach in the academic literature.
5.1 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
Building on models in which wage indexation is based on cur-
rent inflation, the indexation literature infers that wage indexation
would be a powerful reason to prefer a flexible exchange rate re-
gime over a fixed exchange rate regime. This result has come out
under the traditional approach in which the policymakers are as-
sumed to be concerned only with output stabilization, as well as
under the more modern approach in which the policymakers are
assumed to be concerned with maintaining low inflation along with
output stability, but in which their preferences are time inconsis-
tent and exhibit an inflation bias. The crux of the argument is that
wage indexation helps to protect output from monetary shocks
regardless of the exchange rate regime in place. If this effect is
true, wage indexation makes a fixed exchange rate unnecessary
for dealing with monetary shocks and reduces the incentives to
create inflationary surprises.
Consider first the traditional approach that evaluates exchange
rate regimes according to the extent to which they help to stabilize
output. While it is obviously recognized that anything can happen in
the more general case of an arbitrary degree of indexation, the lit-
erature shows that with optimal wage indexation, in which the de-
gree of indexation is optimally chosen to minimize the deviations
between the actual and the frictionless level of output, a floating
exchange rate regime is always better or at least as good as a fixed
exchange rate regime.19 This result hinges on the prediction that
19. This proposition is put forth by Flood and Marion (1982), and Aizenman and
Frenkel (1985a, b, 1986). The latter also show that around the optimal degree of wage
indexation, a higher degree of indexation raises the optimal degree of exchange rate
flexibility. In addition, they show that the concept of optimal wage indexation based
on the minimization of the expected squared discrepancy of actual output from its
frictionless level is equivalent to a concept of optimal wage indexation based on the
minimization of the welfare cost of the distortions existing in the labor market.248 Esteban Jadresic
wage indexation helps to protect output from monetary shocks re-
gardless of the exchange rate regime in place. If this effect is true,
wage indexation clearly weakens the key merit of a fixed exchange
rate regime under the criterion of output stabilization.
Wage indexation would also be a strong reason for preferring a
flexible exchange rate regime if policymakers are concerned with
maintaining low inflation along with output stability. This issue
has been examined using a Barro and Gordon (1983) framework in
which the policymakers’ preferences are time inconsistent and ex-
hibit an inflationary bias. In such a context and in the absence of
wage indexation, it is generally accepted that a fixed exchange
rate can perform better than a flexible exchange rate; this result
requires that the fixed exchange rate increase the credibility of
low inflation and that the benefits of this improved credibility out-
weigh the costs of losing flexibility to adjust to aggregate shocks.20
In contrast, the indexation literature shows that if the degree of
wage indexation is optimal in the sense explained above, a flexible
exchange rate regime generally gives better results than a fixed
exchange rate regime.21 As in the previous paragraph, this result
also hinges on the prediction that wage indexation helps to pro-
tect output from monetary shocks. To the extent that this effect is
true, wage indexation obviously reduces the incentives to create
inflationary surprises and thus weakens the usefulness of the cred-
ibility effect associated with a fixed exchange rate regime.
Despite the faultless logic of the above arguments, the conclu-
sion that wage indexation makes a flexible exchange rate generally
preferable over a fixed exchange rate is unwarranted once the lags
in actual indexation rules are taken into account. As is clear from
the argument, that proposition depends crucially on the premise
that wage indexation protects output from monetary shocks even
when the exchange rate is flexible. As is also clear from the analy-
sis in the previous sections, such a premise does not conform
with the results obtained above, at least as a general or significant
proposition.
20. This result can be formally derived by applying Barro and Gordon’s (1983)
analysis of inflationary bias with discretionary policy in an open economy context.
See, for instance, Alogouskofis (1994); Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
21. This result is due to Rasmussen (1993). It requires the condition that wage
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What, then, are the general implications of the analysis on the
choice of exchange rate regime? The broad similarity of the behavior
of output with and without wage indexation suggests that the choice
of exchange rate regime in economies with wage indexation depends
on the same type of factors that affect the choice of exchange rate
regime in economies without wage indexation. For instance, wage
indexation seems unlikely to significantly alter the possible tradeoff
between credibility of low inflation and flexibility in dealing with
aggregate shocks, which part of the literature attributes to the choice
between a fixed and flexible exchange rate. Therefore, while consid-
ering the existence of wage indexation does not help solve the long-
standing problem of which exchange rate regime is optimal, it also
does not appear to be a crucial factor in deciding the optimal regime.
This suggested implication contrasts sharply with the suggestion of
the academic literature that wage indexation generally makes a flex-
ible exchange rate preferable.
A corollary of the above is that the existence of wage index-
ation is unlikely to be a good reason for implementing an indexed
exchange rate regime. This is confirmed in Jadresic (1998), which
finds that regardless of the type of contract in the economy, the
effects of such a regime on output and real exchange rate stability
are broadly similar to those of presetting the path for the exchange
rate. In the end, with or without wage indexation, the main dis-
tinctive effect of an indexed exchange rate regime seems to be its
well-known adverse effect on inflationary stability.
5.2 The Level and Variability of Inflation
The fact that actual indexation is with respect to lagged rather
than current inflation also has implications for the determination
of the level and variability of inflation. This section explores these
implications.
Whether and how wage indexation affects the level of inflation
depends on the factors that determine monetary policymaking.
The literature typically analyzes this issue in the context of Barro
and Gordon’s (1983) model, under the assumption that the mone-
tary authority has time-inconsistent preferences and cannot cred-
ibly commit to maintaining low inflation. Within this framework,
the academic research has been ambiguous regarding the effects of
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who accept the standard assumption that wage indexation is based
on current inflation and that it thus stabilizes output when shocks
are nominal generally assume that introducing wage indexation
reduces the incentives to create nominal surprises and therefore
reduces the level of inflation (for instance, see Fischer and Sum-
mers, 1989; Milesi-Ferretti, 1994; Crosby, 1995). On the other hand,
while not questioning that wage indexation has this anti-inflation-
ary effect, Ball and Cecchetti (1991) argue that this effect is more
than offset by the fact that wage indexation mitigates the cost of
inflation, which is inflationary.
Once the lags in actual wage indexation are considered, wage
indexation seems relatively more likely to increase the level of
inflation. Indeed, the findings discussed above indicate that when
cost-of-living adjustments are based on lagged inflation, the stan-
dard assumption that wage indexation protects output from nom-
inal shocks is unwarranted: wage indexation to lagged inflation
can increase the response of output to a nominal shock, and, more
generally, it modifies the shock’s effect on output substantially
less than is assumed in the literature. Consequently, wage index-
ation to lagged inflation is not necessarily a deterrent to the cre-
ation of nominal surprises, and when it is, it certainly is not as
strong as wage indexation to current inflation. Given that wage
indexation also diminishes the cost of inflation and reduces the
will to fight inflation, then wage indexation seems relatively more
likely to raise the inflation level. Of course, this presumption is
conditional on the postulate that the monetary authority cannot
credibly commit to maintaining low inflation, which is controver-
sial (for instance, see McCallum, 1999).
Regarding the variability of inflation, Gray (1976) and Fischer
(1977) argue that wage indexation increases price variability; this
result implies larger inflation variability, at least in their basic mod-
els. In contrast, Jadresic (1998, 2002) finds that the effects of wage
indexation is ambiguous. For instance, in a closed economy with a
fixed money supply, wage indexation raises inflation variability
when indexed wage contracts are compared to preset time-vary-
ing wage contracts, but it can either raise or lower inflation vari-
ability when indexed wage contracts are compared to short-term
fixed wage contracts. In simulations with an open economy, in turn,
it appears that wage indexation can similarly reduce inflation
variability, but there is no guarantee that this is always the case.251 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has reviewed the macroeconomic consequences of
wage indexation, drawing on recent research by the author. In
line with standard indexation rules, and in contrast to the previ-
ous academic literature, this research treats wage indexation ex-
plicitly as a clause in long-term contracts that grants periodic wage
adjustments according to lagged inflation. To evaluate the conse-
quences of contracts with this type of clauses, the paper models
the behavior of the economy in the absence of indexation using two
alternative standards of reference, namely, contracts that specify
preset time-varying wages and short-term contracts that specify
fixed wages.
Table 3 summarizes some of the main consequences of wage in-
dexation to lagged inflation, contrasting the results of this analysis
Table 3. Summary of the Macroeconomic Consequences
of Wage Indexation
Type of wage indexation
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Prefer flexible exchange rate
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Reduces cost if nonindexed contracts
specify preset time-varying wages;
increases cost if nonindexed contracts
specify fixed wages
Reduces cost if nonindexed contracts
specify preset time-varying wages;




Choice similar with or without
indexation
Ambiguous, but relatively more likely
to increase inflation
Ambiguous
a. With fixed money supply.
b. If the monetary authority cannot credibly commit to maintaining low inflation.252 Esteban Jadresic
with the predictions of the standard approach that assumes that
wage indexation is based on current inflation. The details that un-
derlie the construction of this table have already been discussed
throughout the paper and in the references there provided. For the
record, the result that the effects of wage indexation on the cost of
disinflation under exchange-rate-based stabilization are likely to be
qualitatively similar to those under money-based stabilization is new.
An important lesson that emerges from this summary and com-
parison is that the standard analysis of wage indexation in the aca-
demic literature can provide a very misleading picture of the
consequences of the typical type of wage indexation observed in real
life. This finding should not be very surprising. As soon as one recog-
nizes that standard wage indexation rules define a nominal rather
than a real rigidity, it becomes apparent that the effects of wage
indexation can differ considerably from those predicted by the as-
sumption that wage indexation is based on current inflation. The re-
search reviewed in this paper goes beyond this general statement,
however, by showing that the assumption that wages are indexed to
current inflation is of little usefulness even as a gross approximation
of the issue. Table 3 indicates that in most of the issues examined,
the macroeconomic consequences of wage indexation to lagged infla-
tion are substantially different from the consequences of wage index-
ation to current inflation, even at a qualitative level.
The broad picture that emerges from taking into account the
lags in actual wage indexation validates the views that most poli-
cymakers and applied observers seem to have on the consequenc-
es of wage indexation. The analysis indicates that wage indexation
to lagged inflation can increase the cost of disinflation, destabilize
output regardless of the types of shock in the economy, and mat-
ter relatively little for the choice of exchange rate regime. The
analysis further suggests that unless policymakers are firmly com-
mitted to maintaining low inflation, wage indexation to lagged in-
flation is relatively more likely to increase average inflation.
However, the analysis also indicates that there are important qual-
ifications to be made with respect to these propositions.
In particular, wage indexation to lagged inflation can reduce the
cost of disinflation if the alternative to indexed wage contracts are
contracts that specify preset time-varying wages. Also, in an open econ-
omy and for a given policy regime, wage indexation to lagged inflation
can increase or reduce output stability depending on the specific char-
acteristics of the economy under consideration. A definite evaluation
of what is the more relevant case in practice requires further research.253 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
REFERENCES
Adams, C., and D. T. Coe. 1990. “A Systems Approach to Estimat-
ing the Natural Rate of Unemployment and Potential Output
for the United States.” IMF Staff Papers 37(2): 232-93.
Aizenman, J. 1987. “Wage Indexation.” In The New Palgrave: A
Dictionary of Economics, edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and
P. Newman, 838-40. London: Macmillan.
Aizenman, J., and J. A. Frenkel. 1985a. “On the Tradeoff be-
tween Wage Indexation and Foreign Exchange Intervention.”
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 121: 1-17.
. 1985b. “Optimal Wage Indexation, Foreign Exchange In-
tervention, and Monetary Policy.” American Economic Review
75(3): 401-23.
. 1986. “Wage Indexation, Supply Shocks, and Monetary
Policy in a Small, Open Economy.” In Economic Adjustment
and Exchange Rates in Developing Countries, edited by S.
Edwards and L. Ahamed, 89-129. University of Chicago Press
for the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Alogouskofis, G. 1994. “On Inflation, Unemployment, and the Op-
timal Exchange Rate Regime.” In The Handbook of Interna-
tional Macroeconomics, edited by F. Van der Ploeg, 192-223.
Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell.
Argy, V. 1990. “Choice of Exchange Rate Regime for a Smaller
Economy: A Survey of Some Key Issues.” In Choosing an Ex-
change Rate Regime: The Challenge for Smaller Industrial
Countries, edited by V. Argy and P. De Grauwe, 6-81. Washing-
ton: International Monetary Fund.
Ball, L. 1990. “Credible Disinflation with Staggered Price Setting.”
NBER Working Paper 3555. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
Ball, L., and S. Cecchetti. 1991. “Wage Indexation and Discretionary
Monetary Policy.” American Economic Review 81(5): 1310-19.
Barro, R. J., and D. B. Gordon. 1983. “A Positive Theory of Mon-
etary Policy in a Natural Rate Model.” Journal of Political
Economy 91 (April): 589-610.
Blanchard, O. J., and S. Fischer. 1989. Lectures on Macroeconom-
ics. MIT Press.
Blanchard, O. J., and L. F. Katz. 1997. “What We Know and Do
Not Know about the Natural Rate of Unemployment.” Journal
of Economic Perspectives 11(1): 51-72.254 Esteban Jadresic
Blanchflower, D. G., and A. J. Oswald. 1995. “An Introduction to the
Wage Curve.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(3): 153-67.
Bonomo, M., and R. García. 1994. “Indexation, Staggering and
Disinflation.” Journal of Development Economics 43: 39-58.
Carmichael, J., J. Fahrer, and J. Hawkins. 1986. “Some Macroeco-
nomic Implications of Wage Indexation: A Survey.” In Infla-
tion and Unemployment: Theory, Experience, and Policy-Mak-
ing, edited by V. E. Argy and J. W. Nevile, 78-102. London: G.
Allen and Unwin.
Crosby, M. 1995. “Wage Indexation and the Time Consistency of
Government Policy.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97(1):
105-21.
Devereux, M. 1994. “Wage Indexation, Adjustment, and Inflation.”
In Labor Market in an Era of Adjustment, edited by S. Horton,
R. S. M. Ravi, and D. Mazumdar, vol. 1, 195-236. Washington:
World Bank.
Dornbusch, R. 1976. “Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics.”
Journal of Political Economy 84 (December): 1161-76.
. 1982. “Stabilization Policy in Developing Countries: What
Have We Learned?” World Development 10(9): 701-8.
Edwards, S. 1996. “A Tale of Two Crises: Chile and Mexico.” NBER
Working Paper 5794. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Fischer, S. 1977. “Wage Indexation and Macroeconomic Stability.”
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 5: 107-48.
. 1985. “Contracts, Credibility, and Disinflation.” In Infla-
tion and Unemployment: Theory, Experience, and Policy-Mak-
ing, edited by V. E. Argy and J. W. Nevile. London: George
Allen and Unwin.
. 1988. “Real Balances, the Exchange Rate and Indexation:
Real Variables in a Disinflation.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 103(1): 27-49.
Fischer, S., and L. Summers. 1989. “Should Governments Learn to
Live with Inflation?” American Economic Review 79(2): 382-87.
Fleming, J. M. 1962. “Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and
under Floating Exchange Rates.” IMF Staff Papers 9 (Novem-
ber): 369-79.
Flood, R. P., and N. P. Marion. 1982. “The Transmission of Distur-
bances under Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes with Opti-
mal Indexing.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 97(1): 43-66.255 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
Friedman, M. 1974. “Monetary Correction.” In Essays on Inflation
and Indexation, edited by H. Giersh and others. Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
García, P. S. 1995. “Mercado laboral y crecimiento: Chile 1980-
1994 y proyecciones de mediano plazo.” Colección Estudios
CIEPLAN 40: 39-70. Santiago.
Genberg, H. 1989. “Exchange Rate Management and Macroeco-
nomic Policy: A National Perspective.” Scandinavian Journal
of Economics 91(2): 439-69.
Gray, J. A. 1976. “Wage Indexation—A Macroeconomic Approach.”
Journal of Monetary Economics 2(2): 221-35.
Henderson, D.W., and W. J. McKibbin. 1993. “A Comparison of
Some Basic Monetary Policy Regimes for Open Economies:
Implications of Different Degrees of Instrument Adjustment
and Wage Persistence.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy 39 (December): 221-317.
Hendricks, W. E., and L. M. Kahn. 1985. Wage Indexation in the
United States: Cola or Uncola. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.
Kaufman, R. T., and G. Woglom. 1986. “The Degree of Indexation
in Major U.S. Union Contracts.” Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions Review 39(3): 439-48.
Jadresic, E. 1991. Wages, Indexation, and Aggregate Supply. Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University.
. 1992. “Dinámica de salarios y contratos en Chile.”
Colección Estudios CIEPLAN 34 (June): 5-30. Santiago. For
English version, see “What Type of Contracts Underlie Aggre-
gate Wage Dynamics?” IMF Working Paper 67. Washington:
International Monetary Fund.
. 1995. “Inflación, nivel de actividad y contratos salariales en
Chile.” In Análisis empírico de la inflación en Chile, edited by F.
Morandé and F. Rosende. Santiago: Andros Productora Gráfica.
. 1996. “Wage Indexation and the Cost of Disinflation.”
IMF Staff Papers 43(4): 796-825.
. 1998. “Macroeconomic Performance under Alternative Ex-
change Rate Regimes: Does Wage Indexation Matter?” IMF
Working Paper 118. Washington: International Monetary Fund.
. 2002. “Wage Indexation and Output Stability Revisited.”
Journal of Credit, Money and Banking (forthcoming).
Landerretche, O., F. Lefort, and R. Valdés. 2002. “Causes and Conse-
quences of Indexation: A Review of the Literature.” This volume.256 Esteban Jadresic
Marston, R. C. 1982. “Wages, Relative Prices and the Choice be-
tween Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates.” Canadian Journal
of Economics 15(1): 87-103.
. 1985. “Stabilization Policies in Open Economies.” In Hand-
book of International Economics, edited by R. W. Jones and P.
B. Kenen, vol. 2, 859-916. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Maturana, V. 1992. “Los acuerdos salariales bajo negociaciones
colectivas y la situación macroeconómica.” Thesis, Pontificia
Universidad Católica de Chile. Santiago.
McCallum, B. T. 1999. “Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy
Rules.” Handbook of Macroeconomics, edited by J. B. Taylor
and M. Woodford. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. 1994. “Wage Indexation and Time Consis-
tency.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26(4): 941-50.
Mundell, R. A. 1963. “Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy un-
der Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates.” Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science 29 (November): 475-85.
Morandé, F. G. 1985. “A Note on Wage Indexation in a Model with
Staggered Wage Setting.” Economics Letters 17: 19-22.
Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff. 1996. Foundations of International
Macroeconomics. MIT Press.
Rasmussen, B. S. 1993. “Exchange Rate Policy, Union Wage Index-
ation, and Credibility.” Journal of International Economics 35:
151-67.
Rebelo, S., and C. A. Végh. 1995. “Real Effects of Exchange Rate-
Based Stabilization: An Analysis of Competing Theories.” NBER
Working Paper 5197. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Riveros, L. A. 1996. “Adjustment, Inflation and Equity Effect: A
Literature Survey on Wage Indexation.” Unpublished paper.
University of Chile. Santiago.
Rodriguez, C. A. 1982. “The Argentine Stabilization Plan of De-
cember 20th.” World Development 10: 801-11.
Simonsen, M. H. 1983. “Indexation: Current Theory and the Bra-
zilian Experience.” In Inflation, Debt and Indexation, edited
by R. Dornbusch and M. H. Simonsen, 99-132. MIT Press.
Taylor, J. B. 1980. “Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts.”
Journal of Political Economy 88(1): 1-23.
Turnovsky, S. J. 1983. “Wage Indexation and Exchange Market
Intervention in a Small Open Economy.” Canadian Journal of
Economics 16(4): 574-92.257 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation
. 1995. “Macroeconomic Stabilization Policy under Ratio-
nal Expectations.” In Methods of Macroeconomic Dynamics,
201-30. MIT Press.
Van Gompel, J. 1994. “Stabilization with Wage Indexation and Exchange
Rate Flexibility.” Journal of Economic Surveys 8(3): 251-81.
Williamson, J. 1985. “Concluding Appraisal.” In Inflation and In-
dexation: Argentina, Brazil and Israel, edited by J. Williamson,
167-78. Washington: Institute for International Economics.